The whole speculation in this paper is an attempt to suggest that the foundations of mathematics ought not always to be studied "mainly in the framework of logico-mathematical technique" and that the discrepancies in one way or another of the standpoints on the fundations of mathematics is perhaps due to the duality of human nature, especially on knowing.
1. The Prevailing Opinion of Mathematicians. "Studies in the foundations of mathematics tend to converge in their $aims\cdots Hilbert' s$ formalism has taught us that we have not yet leamt how to study mathematics except under the guidance of the traditional 'esprit gdo-$mdtrique'\cdots Further$, when the catchword 'the salvation of mathematics' has lost its profound meaning and the theory of consistency has been defined as one pertaining to the formal system, that is, a problem in metamathematics, metamathematics has been liberated from the shackles of the 'finitary' standpoint, and thus given a varied choice of standpoints. In this way, researches in the foundations of mathematics which have hitherto been very much diversified have come to fall into the following ,two categories; suggestions of formal systems and metamathematics conceming them".1) This view is probably shared by most specialists today. In so far as the foundations of mathematics is regarded as a branch of mathematics, such a change in it as is described in the above quotation comes only natural from a process of narrow screening of its objects and methods. Philosophical thinking is placed out of account here. This point of view gives rise to statements like the following. "The presentday problems of the foundations of mathematics, as we see, are investigated mainly in the framework of logico-mathematical technique.-The philosophical disputation conceming the standpoint from which the logico-mathematical constructions are employed, has, therefore, been usually disregarded.-From this point of view, which may be taken for granted by almost every mathematician, a philosophical inquiry into the abovementioned question,2) would be of little importance."3) The present writer, for one, agrees on the whole to the prevailing opinion of mathematicians exemplified in the two quotations above. Assuredly, as history shows, it will be fruitless even in the foundations of mathematics to discuss mathematics transcendentally from a particular presumed philosophical standpoint.
2. Formalism and 'Foundation'. Notwithstanding, it seems to the present writer that, when we speculate on the foundations of mathematics, we end by being in spite of ourselves drawn into philosophical thinking, or, at any rate, into something like it. This apparently heretical view is a product of an opinion quite of its own about the purpose of the foundations of mathematics. The present writer thinks that the purpose of the foundations of mathematics consists in 'foundation',4) which is, broadly speaking, "to judge whether what is supposed to be known is really known" and "to ascertain whether a seemingly self-evident matter is really an indisputable fact" : in short, "to demand persistently a proof of correctness".5) This mental attitude taking rise from man's natural desire for knowledge can be vindicated sufficiently. But it is clearly distinct from the prevailing view, which holds that the raison d'\^etre of a mathematical system lies in its consistency. As stated in the previous chapter, here consistency has lost its original deeper meaning and come to be defined as a problem in metamathematics. This fact means not that this standpoint has been modified, but, on the contrary, that its has further clarified its essential character. Again, it implies that the foundations of mathematics as studied from such a standpoint is not worthy of the name in its literal sense, but is a mere branch of mathematics.
The difference between the two standpoints shows more clearly in their attitudes towards the antinomy. The orthodox view directly aims at the elimination of the antinomy and deals with it in terms of consistency. Here reflection on the foundations of mathematics is awakened by an extemal stimulus of the appearance of an antinomy. Whereas, with the other attitude, it is prompted by the desire to Thinking, in its steady pursuit of the truth, ends by calling itself in question. On other words, the subject makes itself an object. This constitutes the peculiarity of philosophy which distinguishes it from the sciences. From "Gnothi seauton" inscribed over the entrance of the temple of Apollo at Delphi to Descartes' "Cogito ergo sum", 'Selbstbewusstsein' was always the keystone of philosophy. In the foundations of mathematics, too, a process of thinking applied to the object is in its tum made an object. When metamathematics, which is in reality not an object but a process of thinking, is to be examined, it is only natural that philosophical thinking, or, at least something like it, should be required. This is a tentative formal' conclusion of this paper.
The present writer does not emphasize the improtance of philosophical thinking because he likes to increase the difficulty of the problem. Formalism has done well in eliminating philosophical humbugs from the foundations of mathematics and thus establishing itself on a scientific basis, and in this respect it can claim full appreciation. However, in so far as it is concemed with the 'Begrundung der Mathematik', it can never escape many aporias which hardly ever fail to present themselves in fundamental thinking, as is commonly the case in philosophy. "Now, our theme is the theory of real number and generally the set theory which covers much the same field as logic. Is the 'Beweisstheorie' itseH not subject to the postulates of the set theory or logic ? In other words, when an ultimate standpoint is persistently called to account, is it not likely that, so far as it is truly ultimate, having nothing but itself to provide a guarantee of its correctness, it is driven into a vicious circle ? This is why formalism seems to be far from its objective, although many interesting works have successively been published today by distinguished mathematicians under Hilbert".
6)
This view will be shared by all unprejudiced students. 
